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A reexamination of additivity of power in randomized social preference


Reference:

Nandeibam, S., 2003. A reexamination of additivity of power in randomized social preference. Review of Economic Design, 8, pp. 293-299.

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Official URL:

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-003-0103-1

Abstract

We show that Barberá and Sonnenschein’s (1978) power function becomes additive if we replace the Paretian condition by nonimposition and monotonicity. Since these conditions are very much in the spirit of Arrow (1951), our result sharpens the analogy to Arrow’s theorem

Details

Item Type Articles
CreatorsNandeibam, S.
DOI10.1007/s10058-003-0103-1
DepartmentsFaculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Social & Policy Sciences
Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics
RefereedYes
StatusPublished
ID Code10099

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