Research

Implementation in teams


Reference:

Nandeibam, S., 2003. Implementation in teams. Economic Theory, 22 (3), pp. 569-581.

Related documents:

This repository does not currently have the full-text of this item.
You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided below.

Official URL:

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0327-2

Abstract

Summary. This paper considers a team production model in which the final output is a function of one or more observable intermediate variables that are functions of the actions of the team members. When there is only one intermediate variable, our model essentially reduces to the standard models in which only the final output is observable. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for implementing an outcome. This condition imposes restrictions on the possible deviations from the outcome that can be caused by every member of the team unilaterally. As a consequence of this characterization, when there are more than one intermediate variable, we are able to show that in a broad class of problems these intermediate variables may be sufficiently informative to allow sharing rules that implement efficient outcomes.

Details

Item Type Articles
CreatorsNandeibam, S.
DOI10.1007/s00199-002-0327-2
DepartmentsFaculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Social & Policy Sciences
Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics
RefereedYes
StatusPublished
ID Code10100

Export

Actions (login required)

View Item