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Sharing rules in teams


Reference:

Nandeibam, S., 2002. Sharing rules in teams. Journal of Economic Theory, 107 (2), pp. 407-420.

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Official URL:

http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2953

Abstract

We examine the problem of output sharing in a moral hazard in team situation. Although we do not consider any particular procedure, we assume that the team uses some procedure to decide a sharing rule before actual production takes place (for example, this may be a bargaining process or a team welfare maximization problem). This must take into account that the team will play a noncooperative game in the production process conditional on the chosen sharing rule. We show that the procedure for deciding the sharing rule does not have to look for anything more complicated than simple linear sharing rules. We also show that, when there is limited liability, the procedure needs to consider only the slightly more complicated piecewise linear rules. As a consequence of the linear sharing rule result, we are also able to provide a characterization of implementable outcomes.

Details

Item Type Articles
CreatorsNandeibam, S.
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2953
DepartmentsFaculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Social & Policy Sciences
Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics
RefereedYes
StatusPublished
ID Code10181

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