The Structure of Coalitional Power under Probabilistic Voting Procedures


Nandeibam, S., 2002. The Structure of Coalitional Power under Probabilistic Voting Procedures. Social Choice and Welfare, 19, 685--705.

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We consider probabilistic voting procedures which map each feasible set of alternatives and each utility profile to a social choice lottery over the feasible set. It is shown that if we impose: (i) a probabilistic collective rationality condition known as regularity; (ii) probabilistic counterpart of Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives and citizens' sovereignty; (iii) a probabilistic positive association condition called monotonicity; then the coalitional power structure under a probabilistic voting procedure is characterized by weak random dictatorship


Item Type Articles
CreatorsNandeibam, S.
DepartmentsFaculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Social & Policy Sciences
Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics
ID Code10182


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