Social Policy in Unsettled Societies: the Case for a Wellbeing Regime Framework

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Introduction

Esping-Andersen developed the notion of welfare state regimes in rich OECD countries as a function of political settlement over core values and priorities. Gough and Wood modified these arguments by introducing a comparative analysis of welfare regimes across the globe to capture situations where the state's role is reduced, due to a lack of consensus over core values and priorities and a consequent inability to de-commodify markets for welfare or well-being objectives. Such comparative analysis is essentially making distinctions between relatively settled and unsettled societies. The approach is aided by a notion of the ‘institutional responsibility matrix’ in which the dimensions of the state, market, community and household in both domestic and international planes are problematic for individuals differentiated by age and gender. The more problematic, the less the society is politically settled. So the question for any country is where does it lie on a settled-unsettled continuum?

This paper is the theoretical arm of a wider project, which is applying ideas about wellbeing and comparative social policy to the 'regime' conditions facing politically unsettled societies, characterised by large-scale problems of poverty (see Copestake and Wood 2007 for an application to Peru). It seeks to lay the general foundations for such analysis by moving us along from recent work by Gough, Wood and others on the comparative analysis of insecurity and welfare regimes across different regions of the world (Gough, Wood et al 2004, Wood and Gough 2006) towards an enriched concept of wellbeing regimes which takes social policy closer to a development studies discourse about social development (Wood 2000a).

The paper begins with a summary of this recent work on comparative welfare regimes. In doing so, it recognises several qualifications to an argument that in effect posits a continuum between the full statutory rights to welfare in the form of social protection at one end (i.e. the OECD welfare state model) through to chronic and pervasive insecurity at the other end, where the state enjoys minimal legitimacy and capacity. These ‘qualifications’ refer both to welfare and social policy as concepts, and to assumptions about the nation-state in terms of internal integration and social cohesion, as well as the disarticulation effects of globalisation. In the marriage between social policy and development studies, the intellectual and policy links between a welfarist approach to social policy and a wellbeing agenda of social development become more clearly exposed. And western social policy thinkers themselves are moving a long way towards a social development perspective in which capacity building (widely conceived) becomes arguably more significant than social protection, though there is never an 'either-or' trade-off. Such capacity building takes us into the discourses of capabilities, freedoms, competences and skill sets, and the wider acquisition of resources for citizenship. This capacity building and agency-enhancement discourse also requires us to recall the 'removal of alienation' as the partial flip-side to the improvement of well-being. This gathering together of concepts linking social policy to social development and wellbeing refers us to a broader range of policy instruments than those associated with the more limited 'welfare' approaches to social policy, whereby state and non-state actors might act to engineer improvement. The nation-state assumptions of our previous work focussed more upon the problematic of the state in terms of legitimacy and relative autonomy to act in technico-rational ways, and less upon the problems of the social cohesion and integration in politically unsettled

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3 With liberal, conservative and social-democratic variations
4 See also Wood 2007b, which examines the search for the ‘security of agency’ in overcoming alienation.
societies. Thus the issue of political order needs to become more significant in our analysis as a precondition for social development, recognising the circularity in that social development itself contributes to political order. Again, this implies that the business of social policy entails wider 'social engineering' objectives (captured by shifting from 'welfare' regimes to 'wellbeing' regimes), and a corresponding broadening of instruments and stakeholders crucially including non-state actors. Such non-state actors may be the familiar organised civil society and NGO leaders from the educated middle classes. They may also be sections of the unorganised middle classes with the potential to be mobilised into alliances with the poor around common interests, expressed broadly as public goods.5

I explore these arguments by recalling the elements of the Wood and Gough (2006) comparative welfare regimes model (Figure 1 below), reviewing each of its components in turn against the criteria of broader wellbeing objectives and processes. This leads us to a revised model (Figure 2 below) which embraces more obviously the socio-political conditions of unsettled societies, the policy objective of enhancing the agency of the poor in societies with weak 'responsibility institutions' through support for their profile of 'negotiation resources', and the significance of non-state actors (organised and unorganised) in the construction of second-best political settlements for enriched social policy.

One further note of caution before we proceed. For heuristic purposes, conceptual contrasts are drawn between politically settled and unsettled societies, between welfare and wellbeing, between 'freedom from' and 'freedom to' agendas, between human capital and capabilities/agency, between social policy and social development. These contrasting dyads or ideal types are intended to indicate (or to stylise) directions of change in policy. The reality, of course, is greyer. Take the contrast between 'freedom from' in the sense of social protection and 'freedom to' in both a human capital investment sense and a broader capabilities and agency sense. This is more about adding ambitions for policy rather than replacing or substituting new ones for old ones. Clearly 'freedom from' insecurity is a major precondition for the 'freedom to' act to bring about more wellbeing oriented political settlements in the future (Wood 2007a). Or, with the settled/unsettled contrast, in critiquing the state and highlighting the agency and non-state actors position, we are not assuming that the concept of 'political settlement' for policy priorities is entirely missing and that the state is totally inactive in the relevant policy fields and services for poverty reduction. Rather we are observing that such efforts are significantly contaminated and attract limited loyalty and therefore legitimacy from the society for such political settlements to be entirely functional. Thus political settlements themselves need to be improved through agency, alliance building, and the framing of ideology and discourses to support more progressive social policy.

**Comparative Welfare Regimes**

The idea of a welfare regime has been taken by Gough and Wood (2004) beyond Esping-Andersen's (1990, 1999) typology of welfare states for advanced capitalist regions of the world (OECD countries) towards a global framework of welfare regimes embracing welfare state regimes alongside informal security and in/security regimes. Several principles underpinned that wider framework. **First**, that states in poor countries have problems of legitimacy and that well-functioning labour and financial markets are not pervasive. **Second**, that these problematic conditions limit the capacity of the state to act in a compensatory way for the inequitable outcomes of the market in highly unequal societies (both vertically and horizontally). **Thirdly**, that a comparative conception of social policy has to embrace non-state centred actors. This implies, **fourthly**, that rights and entitlements may also be found (in some instances, with some security) in the informal domains of social relationships and cultural expectations. Some of these domains are more formally organised (churches and mosques, charities, NGOs and philanthropy generally), while others are more personalised in a range of clientelist and reciprocal (perhaps kin) arrangements. **Finally**, attached to the notion of 'regime' is the assumption of path dependency, with outcomes from political economy and the deliberate interventions of state and non-state actors comprising the process of social reproduction--both simple (static) and extended (dynamic). Simple reproduction totally enshrines path dependency. Extended reproduction introduces possibilities of new mobilisations, identities and solidarities with the potential to alter the regime's direction.

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5 Wood and Newton explored the prospects for such common agendas between poverty alleviation and the middle class interest in public goods in the context of Bangladesh (Wood and Newton 2005)
The overarching model adopted for this comparative welfare regime analysis is represented (from Wood and Gough 2006) in the Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Comparative Welfare Regimes Model

Beginning at the right-hand bottom of Figure 1 the welfare outcomes of the population represent the classic objectives that social policy might be expected to meet with some help from other policy sectors. These refer to the need-satisfactions of the population (the extent to which their basic and intermediate needs are met), the insecurity they experience and the extent of poverty and other measures of low or inadequate resources. But in our model, these welfare outcomes are not explained simply by the presence and practice of policy. Rather these outcomes are explained most immediately by the agency-structure interaction in the Institutional Responsibility Matrix (IRM) or welfare mix (top right of Figure 1): that is, the institutional landscape within which people have to pursue their livelihoods and welfare objectives, referring to the role of government, community (informal as well as organized, such as NGOs, CBOs), private sector market activity, and the household in mitigating insecurity and ill-being, alongside the role of matching international actors and processes. The welfare mix in turn is greatly shaped by the basic institutional conditions in a country (top left of Figure 1): the pervasiveness and character of markets, the legitimacy of the state, the extent of societal integration, cultural values and the position of the country in the global system. Finally, under reproduction consequences the stratification system and pattern of political mobilisation by elites and other groups (bottom left of Figure 1) is both cause and consequence of the other factors. The stratification system refers to the existing distribution of power in society and the extent and nature of societal inequalities. These and the attendant mobilisations of different groups and coalitions will reproduce or change the institutional conditions of the society, and thus reproduce or change the welfare mix and patterns of welfare of the country. On the other hand, the welfare mix and welfare outcomes also influence the nature of political mobilisations in the future. As discussed below, these processes of reproduction can be simple and purely path dependent, or dynamic and altering the terms of political settlement.

6 The term ‘political settlement’ refers to the de facto agreements or settlements, which have evolved between different classes, groups and interests over time regarding the principal ways in which the society is run, de facto rights are distributed and resources are allocated. Such settlements can perpetuate welfare inequalities as a reflection of power and domination. They can also enshrine concessions to politically weaker groups, as well as the exclusion of others. They may also embrace commitments to public goods by elites, as part of enlightened self-interest.
Enriching the Social Policy Agenda: an Imperative for Unsettled Societies

However, on reflection these arguments are not exhaustive. In extending the embrace of social policy beyond OECD-type countries to unsettled societies, further institutional, social and cultural complexities need to be recognised, which were not fully dealt with in our former model. Basically the argument advanced in this paper is that, first, the welfare outcomes box (bottom right in Figure 1 above) needs to be converted into an enriched wellbeing outcomes box. And, secondly, that the institutional conditions box (top left hand of Figure 1) requires more analysis, especially around the issues of socio-political integration—both vertical and horizontal—and thus making more of a contrast between politically settled and unsettled societies. As a result of these considerations, it is better re-labelled as ‘conditioning factors’. And, thirdly, given the problematic nature of the state in unsettled societies, the principle underlying social policy needs to be more focussed upon the enhancement of agency among the poor and insecure. Indeed the ‘security of agency’. And, fourthly, extending the same assumptions, that social policy has to comprise greater activity by non-state actors, whether in organised forms (e.g. NGOs, charities etc.) or informal, often local level, forms of philanthropy and mutual support and collective action.

The traditional question addressed by social policy is essentially Hegelian, modified by Polanyi. The argument is that society without some political ordering (Hegel) produces insecurity, and that the market economy, without some market regulation (Polanyi), produces livelihood inequities. Both outcomes store up political danger. Furthermore, market regulation is both symptomatic of political order as well as contributing to it. The preoccupation with welfare (as distinct from wellbeing) in social policy has led to an over-emphasis upon the Polanyian principle (that a purely commodified labour market under capitalism is no guarantor of basic livelihoods rights) rather than the Hegelian one. That emphasis betrays the ethnocentrism of social policy, having its intellectual roots in relatively settled societies, hitherto undisturbed by globalisation except to benefit from metropolitan positions in the imperial and post-imperial eras. This ethnocentrism comprises the liberal assumption that the ordering of society is only the business of the state insofar as societal disorder undermines the conditions for spreading universal but minimal welfare, itself a precondition for political order and simple social reproduction. Today's challenge is: what about societies that are not relatively settled in political terms, with the prospect of chronic societal disorder? And that question might also apply to societies that were relatively settled until disturbed by contemporary features of globalisation (migration, multi-ethnicity, refugees and asylum entitlements, amoral global capitalism without loyalties to local workforces).

These conditions prompt the new agenda for social policy, and they are now as Hegelian as they are Polanyian: in other words, they need to be about political order and improved settlements, as well as about market regulation and taxed based re-distribution.

From Welfare to Wellbeing (Bottom Right Hand Box, Figure 1)

One way to pose the challenge is to argue that social policy should be about wellbeing not just welfare. This becomes an argument that wellbeing embraces a larger agenda in which individuals’ senses of wellbeing is affected not only by their own welfare, but the welfare and wellbeing of others in other groups. This proposition can be extended further by arguing that individuals’ wellbeing cannot be assessed in isolation from, but only in relation to that of others. Hence social policy is about the capacity of society-level institutions and social processes to guarantee some concept of collective wellbeing. Such a proposition is akin to the view that personal happiness is some function of aggregate or utilitarian happiness and to the idea of the “common good” (Deneulin 2006). This clearly extends the remit of social policy towards, one might say, an interdisciplinary development one. However, the significance of non-state actors in this remit has to be acknowledged in relatively unsettled societies, so a wellbeing perspective cannot just be an argument for social engineering by the state to bring about utilitarian outcomes. Rather, in unsettled conditions, the agenda is about who has the power to bring about the collective advantage of utilitarian happiness rather than the competitive individualism of personal happiness, which is anyway dependent upon the happiness of others? And what are the positive and negative social conditions, which inhibit or enhance such a quest for collective advantage?
It will be that configuration of power, and the associated forms of social reproduction, which will comprise a wellbeing regime. However, before examining further the political problems to be overcome in establishing a successful wellbeing regime, let us dwell upon the normative significance of a wellbeing perspective for social policy. It will, nevertheless, be difficult to keep the two dimensions, of social policy concepts on the one hand and the political conditions for their realisation on the other, separate and in sequence for the purposes of discussion, because it is our argument that they are theoretically interwoven.

In societies where neither the material resources nor the social capital permits reliance upon the state for statutory rights and entitlements in the form of welfare underpinning (insurance), the reliance upon individual agency has to be correspondingly stronger. It is the enhancing of this agency, or capabilities, which has to become the focus of someone’s policy. It is the deconstruction of this individual agency which contributes to our understanding of wellbeing in unsettled contexts. If we consider the institutional landscape within which people pursue their survival—the institutional responsibility matrix (IRM)—then capabilities have to be specified across the domains (domestic and supranational) of that landscape: the state itself, but also market, community and household. And all the time we have to recognise the structuration principle that successful agency will induce dynamic (in contrast to simple) social reproduction, which can be positive in the sense of enhancing the utility of structures and institutions to the ongoing pursuit of wellbeing. The key to this agenda in unsettled contexts is the distinction between ‘freedom from’ and ‘freedom to’. Thus social policy in the relatively settled societies of the West (or North) has been able to focus upon the principle of ‘freedom from’, leaving ‘freedom to’ agendas to other more obvious human capital investment domains like education and health policy and implementing departments. By contrast, the social policy agenda in unsettled contexts, without deserting the ‘freedom from’ and human security agenda, has also to embrace the social development agenda and thus address the ‘freedom to’ and human development objectives, but not just in a simple human capital, competences and skills investment sense. This is more than a semantic point about the labelling of what goes under the heading of social policy in settled and unsettled societies. It is about where the responsibility lies for addressing the richer capabilities and universal, human needs agendas as between individual agency and collective institutions (whether state or non-state).

Unpacking this further, and at the risk of over-simplification, ‘freedom from’ is here equated with a social protection function in both a Hegelian and Polanyian sense, but weaker in the former and stronger in the latter sense. That is to say a protection from disorder as a precondition for other freedoms and capabilities; and protection from basic income and livelihoods loss through labour market regulation and forms of social insurance and universal benefits. And in settled societies, protection from disorder is so generic and embedded as to be almost unnoticeable for much of the population until recent fears of terrorist induced insecurity, itself a function of globalisation, migration and new forms of alienation for an increasingly varied number of excluded groups. So broadly the more obvious social policy emphasis in settled societies has been income and livelihoods protection, and thus also protection in the narrower material resource sense. So the ‘freedom from’ agenda is security and livelihoods or welfare focussed, and represents only a partial account of the idea of wellbeing, though security surely underpins wellbeing (Wood 2007a). The argument for us in this paper is that the more limited social policy agenda of social protection, while necessary, is not a sufficient option for even security and livelihoods objectives in unsettled societies, because the statutory, collective institutions are not there in the same strength to rely upon. That is the Wood and Gough argument about the weakness of the IRM in unsettled contexts. Thus while welfare regimes have been primarily focussed upon collective and institutional forms of the ‘freedom from’ and human security agenda, the more ambitious wellbeing agenda in the sense of adding ‘freedom to’ and capabilities agendas is in effect forced upon social actors in unsettled societies because of the greater reliance upon personal agency in the context of greater uncertainty and informal rather than statutory arrangements. So is there a paradox here? The more ambitious ‘freedom to’ version of social policy is the greater imperative precisely in those societies where it is institutionally more difficult to achieve? We come to the institutional difficulties below, but having established the imperative we need still to dwell further on the nature of the ‘ambition’.

The ‘freedom to’ agenda is informed by a wellbeing conceptual framework, in turn informed by the capabilities discourse. Unlike some of my colleagues in the WeD programme at UoB, I enter this

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7 ‘Social’ policy because other policy headings like education and health, or agriculture and public works are less likely to engage with the subtlety of the ‘freedom to’ agenda.
discussion by reviving the theme of alienation, attaching it also to the widespread fear of insecurity among all classes, but with particular concern about the Faustian bargain faced by the poor in which their alienation is intensified compared to the non-poor. It seems to me that the whole discourse of 'development as freedom' leading on to the capabilities arguments via entitlement theory has its origin in the alienation problem. This has been expressed differently, but also compatibly, in Doyal and Gough's formulation of qualified autonomy as a universal human need alongside health (1991). Also the significance of autonomy to human functioning is a premise for Ryan and Deci (2000, 2001) in their dissection of how the principle of autonomy has to be qualified in human behaviour--i.e. no-one is suggesting that pure autonomy is possible or desirable. Clearly behind these propositions lies much classic social contract theory emanating from the Enlightenment philosophers. The beauty of alienation as an entry point to bring together the different facets of this argument is that it takes us directly into the process issues of power and agency (i.e. socially and culturally conditioned institutional landscapes with social reproduction outcomes circumscribed by power and agency) as well as the ontology of wellbeing (i.e. the experience of being alienated, as the more pervasive self-perception among non- elites around the world than the enjoyment of qualified autonomy). Thus, in a process sense, alienation is more obviously relational, pointing us towards the various dimensions of inequality in which agency (as choices, options and opportunities) of the many is constrained by the interests of the few. The Faustian bargain (Wood 2003) does not only express this headline problem of inequality and differential power, it also crucially adds the element of ongoing foreclosure of agency via the continuous reinforcement of dependency over autonomy. Thus in place of a normative capabilities approach about empowerment, alienation is more realistically analytical as a way of reporting actual behaviour and feelings. In an ontological sense, alienation draws attention to the threatened nature of wellbeing outcomes (i.e. the constant possibility of illbeing outcomes) and thus takes us beyond the more limited agenda of welfare outcomes. The original Wood/Gough model can be criticised for assuming a positive, unmediated, connection between improvement in income, other HD indicators and wellbeing, without giving due recognition to the security of agency (i.e. the removal of alienation). It is this security of agency (Wood 2007b), which represents the enriched social policy agenda for unsettled societies, characterised by widespread poverty which ontologically entails insecurity of agency--the capabilities problem.

To summarise this progression towards ‘WellBeing Outcomes’ (Bottom Right Hand Box): While the idea of 'welfare' is strongly associated in a Polanyian sense with 'freedom from' objectives with some 'freedom to' support, for example via state support for poor people's education, we have argued above that it insufficiently embraces a stronger 'freedom to' agenda about agency and overcoming alienation. Of course the two dimensions are intimately connected, as Wood has argued elsewhere in linking security to agency to wellbeing (Wood 2003 and 2007a). However, we have to be explicit in highlighting the primacy of agency to the removal of alienation, and thereby the enhancing of wellbeing, in unsettled societies. Thus wellbeing is not just enjoyment of outcomes, but enjoyment of the means of enjoyment. To this end, Sen (1985) and others have emphasised capabilities, Doyal and Gough (1991) have emphasised autonomy, Ryan and Deci have emphasised critical/qualified autonomy (2000) and eudaimonic happiness (2001), Wood has emphasised security (2003), McGregor (2004) has emphasised the enhancement of resource profiles, and earlier Schaffer (1975) emphasised access. All are headed in the same direction of an enriched social policy agenda that resembles social development. This also critically means that while the arrow may go from the IRM to wellbeing outcomes, it crucially has to go in the reverse direction too.

Negotiating the Institutional Responsibility Matrix (IRM): Resources Profiles (Top Right Hand Box, Figure 1)

The next element of the modified wellbeing framework as the guide to an enriched social policy agenda is resources profiling. This enables the link to policy to be established from the ontological understanding of wellbeing as experience of happiness both as process and end-state (eudaimonic and hedonic respectively). The propositions about resources profiles arise from the livelihoods literature, which extended the understanding of poverty to a multi-dimensional level, requiring inter-disciplinary analysis, and included the dimensions of vulnerability and insecurity as they affect the near poor as well as the poor. Resources profiles, as a heuristic device for understanding a wider portfolio of ways in which people survive, cope and advance or defend their interests, thus connects to Rawlsian ideas about citizenship, Sen’s approaches to entitlements and capabilities, and the asset capital frameworks
associated with Swift, Sandford, Moser and later Carney (see Wood 2005 for a review of this literature). However the emphasis upon ‘resources’, in the wellbeing framework, rather than ‘assets or capitals’ does signal a variation of approach. Thus people, as individuals, households, small groups and wider communities, have to deploy a range of resources beyond just material and human capital ones (i.e. social, cultural, political) to negotiate the various parts of the welfare/wellbeing regime framework: the structural, social and cultural conditions; the institutional responsibility matrix (IRM); and the processes of social reproduction. But these resources are both enjoyed hedonically and have to be continuously maintained eudaimonically. Unlike the idea of ‘capital’, which implies a stock which can be both depleted and replenished, ‘resources’ are more a ‘flow’ concept, only existing when maintained through continuous social interaction and demonstrations of cultural belonging (McGregor 2004). It is the fluidity of ‘resources’ which drives much human interactive behaviour, requiring people’s continuous investment in process as a means of reducing uncertainty and insecurity, and either intensifying the Faustian bargain8 or actually managing to remove alienation and gain the ‘freedom to’ as well as the ‘freedom from’: i.e. capabilities as well as social protection.

The link to policy from this epistemology lies in the principle of not only enhancing the quality and therefore utility of these resources but also the capacities to maintain the value of such resources: i.e. improving poor people’s agency. This is the enriched agenda of social policy: enabling more people to negotiate successfully the welfare mix. And crucially it does not assume that enhancing only material or human resources is a sufficient guarantee or condition for such successful negotiation. Thus social policy cannot be successful if it only works ‘indirectly’ through the more limited conception of material poverty: e.g. in the form of income support, or through investment in human capital (health, skills, competences and so on). The whole point of an autonomy/alienation discourse is to draw attention to the needs for direct engagement with these less tangible dimensions of social and cultural functioning. Another way of expressing this is to see the strengthening of social and cultural resources as a process of alliance building with other classes and interests, and therefore as the route to improving the quality of political settlement. This leads directly into the need to focus more upon the role of non-state actors. This is how the social development agenda associated with development studies takes forward the more limited, social protectionist approach to social policy (which includes productivist approaches also, since they rely upon breadwinner concepts of social insurance support, as well as investment in training). But this more subtle social development aspect of social policy also has to interact with the socio-political realities of unsettled societies where the autonomy/alienation problem is most acute and widespread: namely the issues of social cohesion and socio-political integration. Hence the key question: How to achieve successful social and cultural functioning in unsettled societies?

To summarise: the Institutional Responsibility Matrix (Top Right Hand Box) in a wellbeing framework needs to give more analytic recognition of social and cultural resources, non-state actors and alliance building. As a reflection of the conditions of unsettled societies, Wood (2000b) and Wood and Gough (2006) have described the problematic nature of these institutional arenas and the negative permeability between them in terms of rules and practices, which reduce the security of outcomes for disadvantaged people. In this paper, we emphasise two further aspects of this landscape in terms of understanding and policy options. First ‘understanding’: people negotiate their way around this institutional landscape (at domestic and supra-national levels) via their profile of resources. For poor people, there is an instant problem of the extent to which they are included in these problematic rules and practices but under adverse conditions, which ultimately disempower them, reinforces their alienation and sets limits to improving wellbeing. At the same time the social and cultural dimensions of their profile are also likely to keep them excluded from ideological and operational alliances with power-holders, especially the emergent middle classes which are benefiting from globalisation inter alia. Secondly, as politics is about linking one's own specific interests to more universal ones, the capacity for alliance building between the poor and non-state actors is crucial. This is the policy link between capabilities and overcoming the problems of vertical integration: improving the profile of resources in ways, which enable alliance building and sharing of wellbeing agendas9. Thus, in terms of policy options in unsettled societies with severe state legitimacy, integrity and competence problems,

8 Joe Devine in the WeD group reinforces this view that poor people in Bangladesh have a short term preference for dependency over autonomy.
9 This is an argument about the common interests between the poor and the non-poor in the development of public goods.
we have to look to the significance of organised non-state actors. In societies with rapidly growing middle classes the potential for alliances around public goods should not be overlooked. It is worth recalling the significance of such classes to the evolution of progressive social movements in rich European, Latin America and East Asia democracies which have only emerged in the last century from excessively regal or dictatoral regimes.

Conditioning Factors in Unsettled Societies (Top Left Hand Box, Figure 1)

In moving from the determining institutional conditions for welfare regimes (i.e. the emphasis upon state legitimacy and labour and financial markets, derived from Esping-Andersen’s original formulation) towards a broader account of societal conditions, we need to embrace the issues of integration and social cohesion, alongside culture and values. Wellbeing outcomes will be a function of two kinds of social integration: vertical and horizontal. 'Vertical' refers to the quality of linkage between citizen and meso/macro institutions (especially those responsible for the delivery of social policy in its broadest sense) to the point where inclusion and equity is assured. 'Horizontal' refers to the extent of cultural and social diversity, which, under badly integrated conditions, can result in mutually destructive conflict and over-strong, negative conceptions of the other. In relatively unsettled societies, both forms of integration are highly problematical—perhaps that is a tautology. Thus integration becomes the essential problem of societal disorder and individual alienation to the point where wellbeing is unattainable.

This integration agenda is not new. The US Development Administration Group (DAG) of political academics and commentators throughout the 60s and 70s (i.e. Lucian Pye, James Coleman, Gabriel Almond, Fred Riggs) were heavily preoccupied, like S.E. Finer in the UK, with the problematic of political culture and social integration under poor, post-colonial conditions. Their normative stance was a modernisation, nation-building agenda. In the context of an enriched social policy agenda, overcoming problems of vertical and horizontal integration move centre stage, because they set the scene for everything else. But what does 'overcoming' mean? This is normatively clearer for vertical integration through the familiar agendas of participation and civil society involvement in the context of societies pervaded by clientelism and adverse incorporation (another dark side of social capital—Wood 1999). That agenda occurs alongside other classic indicators of democratic engagement such as accountability and strong norms about rights—the liberal bourgeois agenda of achieving political equality even under conditions of severe economic inequality (though simply not possible if the critique of Barrington-Moore is accepted10, hence illusory). But successful vertical integration is itself also a function of horizontal integration, where the post-colonial legacies of cultural and social diversity have often reinforced by the differentiating influences of globalisation. How does social policy cope with extreme heterogeneity and mutual social closure, or reciprocal exclusion—the other dark side of social capital (Putzel 1997)?

This poses a central question about the legitimacy of nation states in highly divided societies, where the state is frequently associated with either elite domination (the vertical integration problem) or ethnic domination (the horizontal integration problem). How can the state, and other non-state centred actors seeking neutrality as the basis for universal philanthropy, remove itself from specific interests in order to be seen as transcending, disinterested authority?11 And today, the additional level of complication is globalisation, further reducing the claims by advocates of the nation state to be able to develop policy for all. The key point here is that the control or reach and legitimacy of nation states is constrained by both internal problems of integration as well as the disarticulation effects of globalisation. This inhibits their room for manoeuvre in terms of control of their own economies and thus the ability to decommodify markets for collective advantage (i.e. for welfare/social protection). Thus the policy area, which is available to them, is more restricted. This, as a result, focuses more attention, as a policy

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10 Barrington-Moore (1969) argued that politics cannot be democratized unless property is also democratized.
11 The model of nation-state building across the fissiparous 19th century Germany was clearly the Hegelian project, but driven by Prussian identity and still ending up with the Landes system as an institutionalisation of regional, sub-national identities.
option, upon the equalisation of advantage between diverse groups through cheaper (financial and political) forms of affirmative action and positive discrimination to engage with 'freedom to' objectives.

The equalisation of advantage is the enabling arena of opportunity and choice creation, and takes social policy beyond its welfare and social protection themes towards social development via support for various elements of the resources profile required by individuals and groups to thrive. Thus, nation states would be acquiring legitimacy precisely through their demonstrable ability to positively support a universally agreed set of essential resources\(^{12}\) required for agency, regardless of class, caste, race, ethnicity or creed.\(^{13}\) This is why the argument for the universality of human needs (Doyal and Gough 1991) is so important, because meeting those needs offers the best chance for nation states to overcome vertical and horizontal integration problems. But this is also why 'human needs' have to be translated into a recognisable framework (profile) of resources, which are also self-evident to the absolute poor and those experiencing relative deprivation and/or vulnerability and insecurity. And in the realm of perceptions (i.e. the reference to self-evidence), senses of wellbeing and happiness\(^{14}\) are key dimensions of any understanding of the resources and needs to be enhanced. In policy terms, there is a discourse and framing issue here. Do state and non-state leaders rely upon the relative perceptions of diverse groups and individuals about their wellbeing needs, or do such leaders act more proactively to convince their diverse, heterogeneous constituencies that whatever divides them is less significant that what should unite them in the form of universal needs? If so, then successful social policy is as much about the framing of a discourse about universal needs\(^{15}\) as the implementation of positive engagement with needs. At this point in the argument, hedonic and eudaimonic distinctions are again necessary--the contrast between delivering immediately pleasurable goods and services, and delivering or ensuring the sustainable means by which they can be achieved more autonomously and continuously--the certainty of such means, i.e. the security of agency, being itself a key ingredient of happiness.

Before specifying the universal elements of wellbeing regimes in more detail, we must reflect further upon the position of the nation state and non state-centred actors in these arguments. With the nation state appearing as the central problem in a globally comparative account of social policy, the roles of other actors above and below the nation state are thus significant in any analysis of power relations, social reproduction and policy outcomes. It is clear that in many of the poorer countries, with which we are primarily concerned for this analysis, the problem for state actors is that power, authority and, more problematically, legitimacy lies significantly elsewhere. This was captured in our earlier formulation of the institutional responsibility matrix (IRM), with global and national level dimensions across the domains of state, market, community and household. The presence of these other loci of power, together with the contaminating permeability between them arising from a deployment of personalised social and cultural resources rather than accessible social capital (i.e. transparent and accountable), reduces the capacity of state actors to act in open democratic ways. Importantly, aspects of globalisation can interact directly with sub-national entities thus by-passing and undermining the state. MNCs deal with ethnic power structures and local warlords to access minerals, precious metals and diamonds, sometimes via interlinked money laundering and arms agreements--thus promoting regional bases of power at the expense of central authority. International donors (including charities) sometimes leapfrog the state to implement projects via regional governments and NGOs. Remittances avoid the taxing capacity of the state. Wider faith movements operate directly with their congregations. Cross border ethnic solidarities represent secessionary challenges to their respective, weakly embedded 'nation' states. Large ethnic concentrations substitute themselves for the national identity as the price for remaining part of a larger whole. Economic and political transactions are conducted through the personalised networks of kin, clan, ethnic, race, caste and other such identities, entailing exclusion and preferentialism. This is clearly a complicated institutional landscape within which to formulate the idea of responsibility for social policy. Equally, it is silly to ignore and wish away such realities.

Of course, as indicated in 'Insecurity and Welfare Regimes' (Gough, Wood et al 2004), countries vary in the capacity of their IRMs to overcome the problems cited above. For example, within sub-Saharan

\(^{12}\) Or 'needs satisfactions' in the Doyal and Gough formulation.

\(^{13}\) These principles lie behind the reservations policy in India, stemming from the Mandal Commission report in the early 90s. It remains a hot issue today in terms of entry to higher education.

\(^{14}\) As exemplified in the quality of life indices being generated through the WeD research, drawing on the wider debates about subjective wellbeing.

\(^{15}\) The MDGs have, of course, been a globally negotiated attempt to do this, but falls short on many of the dimensions discussed here and in other arguments about agency, autonomy and capabilities.
Africa it is difficult to over-generalise because of variations. At the same time we cannot presume a linear movement towards the liberal-democratic pluralism from which OECD social policy evolved. Indeed, we might reasonably observe that the liberal orthodoxies and SAPs, which were inflicted upon Africa through the 70s and 80s, set back state performance decades, by dismantling areas of authority (e.g. state marketing boards, state managed cooperatives, public input supply agencies, food procurement, ration shops and subsidies) which might have become the object of democratic accountability over time, while doing little to improve the openness and transparency of markets which were charged, as replacements, with enhancing productivity and overall welfare. And it is clear from experience in East and SE Asia, that productivist welfare regimes have emerged and have been sustained over time through the retention of central control over levers of economic and social policy. And it is also clear that India, in contrast to its neighbours, continues to reflect a sufficiently strong sense of the state, within a framework of relatively stable democracy, to effect a degree of decommodification—albeit falling short of mass need. Hence the informal security regime classification (in Gough, Wood et al 2004), which applies even more strongly in the other countries of the South Asia region.

**To summarise** this more elaborated account of conditioning factors (Top Left Hand Box): We have now focussed more upon the conditions of unsettled societies, especially in terms of integration (vertical and horizontal) and cohesion variables. These variables, themselves reflect issues of identity, social closure, mutual exclusion and thus a stronger sense of differentiation between culture and values. In other words, the value consensus about priorities and agendas across the policy unit of reference (e.g. nation-state, country) is weak and conflictual, thus also contributing to the problem of legitimacy for state actors. These integration problems are reinforced by the increasing significance of globalisation, since not only nations, but different parts of nations are located differently in the global political economy in terms of opportunities, recognition and identity. This is the local-universal issue in the overall WeD framework at Bath. How is the agenda of wellbeing culturally constructed and socially articulated in ways, which contribute to or detract from the more universal creation of policy? Take the different countries in the Middle East/West Asia region for example, or further East in Bangladesh. The struggle for universality between secular and spiritual criteria ebbs and flows, underpinning chronic conflict and the oscillatory formation of strong and weak political regimes. Sometimes those conflicts are geographical, sometimes tribal and ethnic, and sometimes a function of neighbouring identities in the region (the regional parts of Afghanistan are mirrors to their cross-border neighbours) as well as the differentiating effects of globalisation (as in Bangladesh [Wood 2007c], Pakistan or Iran). Peru is a particularly strong case of distinct regions (coastal, Andean and Amazonian) with deeply differentiated cultural and social conditions, reinforced by centuries of globalisation in various forms and not unified by the sense of Spanish universality (Copestake and Wood 2007). Thailand, although often understood through strong notions of Thai-ness as part of royal and state ideology, is increasingly revealed as a composite of discrete cultural and social forms from the Muslims in the South, to the Lao and Cambodian identities in the East and North-East, and the Indo-Burman cultures of the hilly North-West among the Karen. Ethiopia, it seems, is many nations, relying on the 'construction' of Eritrea as external enemy as a crucial part of state management of 'integration'.

In other words the competition for hearts and minds about concepts of wellbeing is widespread and ongoing, and an important anti-dote to Western discourses about universality as embodied in MDGs, HDIs, and World Bank attempts to set the global social policy discourse. Can we be more meta than meta in order to have consensus? Only if we value a single hegemonic version over diversity. But as argued earlier in this paper, the 'trick' is to ask when does diversity harm people, and to what extent can universality at some level of abstract principle overcome the harmful effects of diversity while preserving its contribution to more local versions of wellbeing? This question thus has to be captured in a modified bottom right hand box, otherwise it exists independently and thus unrealistically of the conditioning factors.

**Reproduction Consequences (Bottom Left Hand Box, Figure 1)**

In the original regimes model, the issue of path dependency has been central. Esping-Andersen (1991) essentially argued for the ‘regime’ idea precisely because he could detect continuous political settlements around social policy, with stratification outcomes which reinforced existing arrangements. In expanding the comparative reach of the welfare regime idea, Gough and Wood et al (2004) accepted the strength of path dependency as a factor in determining differing routes taken by different societies
to welfare. In other words, we cannot be unrealistic and utopian about prospects for radical change. But at the same time, since we are all broadly assuming that change is a sine qua non for development strategies towards poverty reduction and the pursuit of improved wellbeing, we must look to those features of agency which go beyond acting within known constraints and which are pushing at the frontiers of room for manoeuvre. That is precisely the object of an enriched agenda of social policy, wherever the drivers and leaders of it can be found. Success will then be understood in terms of expansion of opportunities and the emergence of new forms and loci of power. These in turn challenge prevailing political settlements; set in motion institutional reform, new aspirations, expectations and confidence; and thus alter the conditioning factors in a conducive direction. It is most likely that such a general process will be the accumulation of minor advances: incrementalism rather than outright revolution. And the key principle, as enunciated in Wood and Gough (2006) is the encouragement of processes of de-clientelisation as the stepping stone towards de-commodification. Take, for example, the potential to transform highly informal and personalised claims (for social protection and safety support) more towards an acknowledgement of rights and needs-based entitlements in Northern Pakistani villages. (Wood, Malik and Sagheer eds 2006) Where the philanthropy of the local mosque is in effect the exercise of patronage by a group of village elders with all kinds of hidden criteria to meet, this can be replaced by more explicit and transparent criteria of allocation as a result of pressure from the poor and the agencies working with them. This becomes, in effect, an element in a revised political settlement at the village level with demonstration effects across other allocation issues (e.g. irrigation, grazing access, subsidised charges for electricity supplied from micro-hydel, and so on). Such changes, added up across the valleys, amount to a minor alteration in the terms of power through mobilisation and leading to a process of reproduction which is dynamic rather than simply path dependent. Such incremental examples are more realistic of the change process in societies with highly institutionalised authority structures than big bang, large-scale mobilisation. However, Bangladesh provides much more obvious examples (through the NGOs movement) of attempted large-scale mobilisation as an expression of enhanced agency and resources profiles, seeking to change at the macro level the terms of political settlement across the country. Such attempts are, naturally, meeting their own resistance, and may be more successful through also building strategic alliances with more powerful classes around the potential common interest in public goods.

To summarise the alternative trajectories for reproduction: Tendencies to success or failure in the IRM and wellbeing outcomes boxes essentially determines the issue of path dependency in the conditioning factors box. This is why we have to distinguish sharply between simple and extended/expanded reproduction, borrowing the term from Marxian discourse about the contrast between the formal and real subsumption of labour under capital (Brenner 1977). Thus mere survival in wellbeing as a function of subordinated, subaltern negotiation of the IRM, in which permeability remains negative, simply reproduces that inequality, exclusion or adverse incorporation, and actually reinforces it. There is no conducive structural or ideological change as a result. The wellbeing of the poor has been capped at low levels of dependent and insecure survival. The relationships of intermediation within the institutional landscape (the IRM) remain intact and reproduce path dependency. Interests and power have been protected and consolidated. In Bangladesh, this could be summarised as continuation of the mastaani culture (local mafia-type, patronage and broker hierarchies). (Khan 2000) But options for establishing more dynamic trajectories in place of path dependency are clearly evident. They may be at local levels in the society, cautiously expanding the room for manoeuvre through an incremental conversion of personalised claims into more acknowledged rights. They may occur as an outcome of more deliberate, larger-scale mobilisation through NGOs, seeking to break the mastaani culture. And they may take the form of new alliances between the poor and organised fractions of the middle class (for either altruistic motives or enlightened self interest in public goods). All such options offer the prospect of disturbing present intermediation arrangements (i.e. de-clientelisation) and reproducing something else that sets in motion a virtuous cycle across the model. But given the significance of non-state actors in this scenario, we need to consider ‘second-best’ political settlements for wellbeing as the medium-term regime form, and as a stepping stone towards more state-led de-commodification.

Given these revising arguments above, Figure 2, below, now represents a well-being version of the previous model.
Conclusion: the Case for a Wellbeing Regime Framework

My proposition is that in societies where neither material resources nor social relations permit reliance upon the state for statutory rights and entitlements to welfare, then reliance upon individual agency mixed with local level collective action has to be correspondingly stronger. It is the enhancing of this agency (or set of capabilities) which has to become more central to policy analysis. If we consider the institutional landscape (i.e. top right hand section of Figure 2 above) within which people pursue their survival, then capabilities have to be specified across the domains (domestic and supranational) of that landscape: the state itself; but also market, community and household. And all the time we have to recognise the structuration principle that successful agency will induce dynamic (in contrast to simple) social reproduction (i.e. bottom left hand section of Figure 2), which can be positive in the sense of enhancing the utility of structures and institutions to the ongoing pursuit of wellbeing.

As reviewed in the earlier part of this paper, the key to this agenda in unsettled contexts is the distinction between 'freedom from' and 'freedom to'. Thus social policy in the relatively settled societies of most Western countries has been able to focus upon the principle of 'freedom from', leaving 'freedom to' agendas to other more obvious domains like education and health policy. By contrast, the social policy agenda in unsettled contexts, while retaining the 'freedom from' and human security agenda, also has to embrace the social development agenda and thus address the 'freedom to' and human development objectives, but in a way that goes beyond investment in individual human capital, competences and skills. This is more than a semantic point about the labelling of what goes under the heading of social policy in settled and unsettled societies. It is about where the responsibility lies for addressing the richer capabilities and universal human needs agendas as between individual agency and collective institutions (whether state or non-state).

The argument in this paper is that the more limited social policy agenda of social protection, while necessary, is not a sufficient option for even security and livelihoods objectives in more unsettled societies, because the statutory, public institutions are not there in the same strength to rely upon. Thus while welfare regimes in settled societies have been primarily focussed upon collective and
institutional forms of the ‘freedom from’ and human security agenda, the more ambitious wellbeing agenda in the sense of adding ‘freedom to’ and capabilities is in effect forced upon people in unsettled societies because of the greater reliance upon personal agency and local level collective action in an unsettled context of greater uncertainty, where informal rather than statutory arrangements prevail. The plea for this paper is that the ‘human’ discourses of rights, development and security has to venture further into the reality of informal domains under conditions of uncertainty and rapid change.

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