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The European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme : Political Economy and Bureaucratic Rent-Seeking


Reference:

Mallard, G., 2009. The European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme : Political Economy and Bureaucratic Rent-Seeking. Working Paper. Bath, U. K.: Department of Economics, University of Bath. (Bath Economics Research Papers; 22/09)

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    Official URL:

    http://www.bath.ac.uk/economics/research/working-papers

    Abstract

    A political economy model is presented that proposes an effective explanation as to why national allocation plans in the emissions trading scheme of the European Union have taken the form they have. The influence of the national bureaucracy, which is omitted in the majority of the related political economy literature, is shown to be potentially significant and costly – particularly through its interaction with the influence of the affected industrialists. The analysis suggests that the role of the national bureaucracy in the design of environmental policy should be carefully considered and structured, and suggests an avenue of potentially important and fruitful future research.

    Details

    Item Type Reports/Papers (Working Paper)
    CreatorsMallard, G.
    DepartmentsFaculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics
    Research CentresBath Economics Research
    StatusPublished
    ID Code15957

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