Provider Incentives and Delivery of Developmental Goods
Reference:
Mishra, A. and Sarangi, S., 2010. Provider Incentives and Delivery of Developmental Goods. Working Paper. Bath, UK: Department of Economics, University of Bath. (Bath Economics Research Working Papers; 14/10)
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Abstract
We use a donor-provider-agent framework to study the delivery of de- velopmental goods (i.e. aid, credit, technology transfer to poor). The need to provide incentives for the intermediate provider has been a key issue in the recent academic as well as non-academic discourses. We show that the use of high-powered incentives can lead to breadkdown of communications between the provider and the agents. We study the interplay between incen- tives and communication failure in the presence of motivated providers who derive bene�ts from helping the disadvantaged.
Details
| Item Type | Reports/Papers (Working Paper) |
| Creators | Mishra, A.and Sarangi, S. |
| Uncontrolled Keywords | developmental goods, communication, incentives, motivated provider |
| Departments | Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics |
| Research Centres | Bath Economics Research |
| Status | Published |
| ID Code | 22126 |
| Additional Information | ID number: 14/10 |
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