Provider Incentives and Delivery of Developmental Goods


Mishra, A. and Sarangi, S., 2010. Provider Incentives and Delivery of Developmental Goods. Working Paper. Bath, U. K.: Department of Economics, University of Bath. (Bath Economics Research Working Papers; 14/10)

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    We use a donor-provider-agent framework to study the delivery of developmental goods (i.e. aid, credit, technology transfer to poor). The need to provide incentives for the intermediate provider has been a key issue in the recent academic as well as non-academic discourses. We show that the use of high-powered incentives can lead to breakdown of communications between the provider and the agents. We study the interplay between incentives and communication failure in the presence of motivated providers who derive benefits from helping the disadvantaged.


    Item Type Reports/Papers (Working Paper)
    CreatorsMishra, A.and Sarangi, S.
    Uncontrolled Keywordsdevelopmental goods, communication, incentives, motivated provider
    DepartmentsFaculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics
    Research CentresBath Economics Research
    ID Code22126


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