Mishra, A. and Sarangi, S., 2010. Provider Incentives and Delivery of Developmental Goods. Working Paper. Bath, U. K.: Department of Economics, University of Bath. (Bath Economics Research Papers; 14/10)
We use a donor-provider-agent framework to study the delivery of de- velopmental goods (i.e. aid, credit, technology transfer to poor). The need to provide incentives for the intermediate provider has been a key issue in the recent academic as well as non-academic discourses. We show that the use of high-powered incentives can lead to breadkdown of communications between the provider and the agents. We study the interplay between incen- tives and communication failure in the presence of motivated providers who derive bene�ts from helping the disadvantaged.
|Item Type ||Reports/Papers (Working Paper)|
|Creators||Mishra, A.and Sarangi, S.|
|Uncontrolled Keywords||developmental goods, communication, incentives, motivated provider|
|Departments||Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics|
|Research Centres||Bath Economics Research|
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