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Coalition formation and the German party system


Reference:

Lees, C., 2011. Coalition formation and the German party system. German Politics, 20 (1), pp. 146-163.

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    Official URL:

    http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2011.554114

    Abstract

    The article uses a thick synthetic analytical framework, derived from the established coalition literature to examine the process of coalition formation in the context of the German party system at the time of the 2009 federal election. It argues that increasing party system fragmentation and fluidity are long-term effects of the critical changes that took place between 1983 and the mid-1990s. These changes have shifted coalition power away from the smaller parties, and in particular the FDP, and towards the two Volksparteien. In terms of the coalition game, the article argues that outcomes cannot be explained by pure office-seeking but that these motives do become important once the desire to avoid unnecessary co-ordination costs, achieve ideological adjacency and reduce ideological range to a minimum has been satisfied. The article concludes by asserting that, rather than being a re-constitution of the default coalition model in Germany, the logic of the 2009 Black?Yellow coalition is consistent with more recent coalition games and therefore is a reflection of change rather than continuity.

    Details

    Item Type Articles
    CreatorsLees, C.
    DOI10.1080/09644008.2011.554114
    DepartmentsFaculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Politics Languages and International Studies
    Publisher StatementLees_2011_German_Politics_20_1_146.pdf: This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Lees, C 2011, 'Coalition formation and the German party system' German Politics, vol 20, no. 1, pp. 146-163, copyright Taylor & Francis, available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/09644008.2011.554114
    RefereedYes
    StatusPublished
    ID Code25969

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