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The Grand Coalition and the party system


Reference:

Lees, C., 2010. The Grand Coalition and the party system. German Politics, 19 (3-4), pp. 312-331.

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    Official URL:

    http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2010.515773

    Abstract

    This article examines the formation of the Grand Coalition in the context of the German party system and draws upon a synthetic analytical framework derived from formal coalition theory. It argues that both the SPD and CDU/CSU would have anticipated that the Grand Coalition would have generated relatively high levels of inter-party conflict as well as significant electoral costs. The article demonstrates that the CDU/CSU's motives for entering a Grand Coalition were quite evident but those of the SPD were more questionable. The SPD's course of action is only explained by a number of specific policy objectives, a desire to minimise co-ordination costs, and through the concept of pure time preference, in which SPD elites demonstrated a preference for an established coalition model over new and untested coalition options. The article concludes that, whilst it is not possible to demonstrate that the Grand Coalition increased the rate of party system fragmentation, it failed to stabilise the declining vote share for the two Volksparteien.

    Details

    Item Type Articles
    CreatorsLees, C.
    DOI10.1080/09644008.2010.515773
    DepartmentsFaculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Politics Languages and International Studies
    Publisher StatementLees_2010_German_Politics_19_3_4_312.pdf: This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Lees, C 2010, 'The Grand Coalition and the party system' German Politics, vol 19, no. 3-4, pp. 312-331, copyright Taylor & Francis, available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09644008.2010.515773
    RefereedYes
    StatusPublished
    ID Code25970

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