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‘Dark Matter’: Institutional Constraints and the Failure of Party-based Euroscepticism in Germany


Reference:

Lees, C., 2002. ‘Dark Matter’: Institutional Constraints and the Failure of Party-based Euroscepticism in Germany. Political Studies, 50 (2), pp. 244-267.

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    Official URL:

    http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00369

    Abstract

    The article is built on four propositions. First, there is a latent potential within the German polity for the mobilisation of what remains a significant level of popular unease about aspects of the ongoing process of European integration. Second, at present this potential is unfulfilled and, as a result, Euroscepticism remains the ‘dark matter’ of German politics. Third, the absence of a clearly stated Eurosceptical agenda is not due to the inherent ‘enlightenment’ of the German political class about the European project, but rather is the result of systemic disincentives shaping the preferences of rational acting politicians. Finally, these systemic disincentives are to be found within the formal institutions of the German polity. The key ideas here are of ‘hard’ versus ‘soft’ Eurosceptical narratives, sustained versus heresthetic agendas, and ‘polis constraining’ versus ‘polis shaping’ strategies for their promotion. Political agents’ choice of strategy depends on the nature of the institutional setting within which they are operating. The institutional configuration of the Federal Republic provides poor returns for party-based Euroscepticism. The mobilisation of popular unease about aspects of European integration remains an unattractive option for rational acting political agents.

    Details

    Item Type Articles
    CreatorsLees, C.
    DOI10.1111/1467-9248.00369
    DepartmentsFaculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Politics Languages and International Studies
    Publisher StatementLees_2002_Political_Studies_50_2_244.pdf: The definitive version is available at www.wileyonlinelibrary.com
    RefereedYes
    StatusPublished
    ID Code27191

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