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Controlling Global Warming: Perspectives from Economics, Game Theory and Public Choice


Reference:

Böhringer, C., Finus, M. and Vogt, C., eds., 2002. Controlling Global Warming: Perspectives from Economics, Game Theory and Public Choice. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

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Abstract

Five papers, from the perspectives of game theory, cost-effectiveness analysis, and public choice, shed light on the problems involved in establishing an international agreement for controlling climate change. Papers discuss the practical implications of game theory for international environmental cooperation and areas for future research (Michael Finus); economic impacts of carbon abatement strategies (Christoph Bohringer and Andreas Loschel); theoretical considerations and empirical findings on the political economy of international environmental agreements (Carsten Vogt); interest group preference for instruments of environmental policy (Jan-Tjeerd Boom); and interest group preference for an international emissions trading scheme (Boom).

Details

Item Type Book/s
EditorsBöhringer, C., Finus, M. and Vogt, C.
DepartmentsFaculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics
RefereedNo
StatusPublished
ID Code28375

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