Controlling Global Warming: Perspectives from Economics, Game Theory and Public Choice
Böhringer, C., Finus, M. and Vogt, C., eds., 2002. Controlling Global Warming: Perspectives from Economics, Game Theory and Public Choice. Edward Elgar.
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Five papers, from the perspectives of game theory, cost-effectiveness analysis, and public choice, shed light on the problems involved in establishing an international agreement for controlling climate change. Papers discuss the practical implications of game theory for international environmental cooperation and areas for future research (Michael Finus); economic impacts of carbon abatement strategies (Christoph Bohringer and Andreas Loschel); theoretical considerations and empirical findings on the political economy of international environmental agreements (Carsten Vogt); interest group preference for instruments of environmental policy (Jan-Tjeerd Boom); and interest group preference for an international emissions trading scheme (Boom).
|Editors||Böhringer, C., Finus, M. and Vogt, C.|
|Departments||Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics|
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