An empirical test of new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements
Finus, M., Saiz, M. E. and Hendrix, E. M. T., 2009. An empirical test of new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements. Environment and Development Economics, 14 (1), pp. 117-137.
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We consider new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs). Applying an empirical model on climate change that comprises benefit and cost estimates from abatement for 12 world regions, we analyze how the design of an agreement affects the success of self-enforcing IEAs. We analyze single versus multiple coalitions, open versus exclusive membership with majority and unanimity voting, and no transfers versus transfers with four different transfer schemes.
|Creators||Finus, M., Saiz, M. E. and Hendrix, E. M. T.|
|Departments||Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics|
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