Playing a better global warming game: does it help to be green?
Reference:
Endres, A. and Finus, M., 1998. Playing a better global warming game: does it help to be green? Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 134 (1), pp. 21-40.
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Official URL:
http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ses:arsjes:1998-i-2
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Abstract
It is commonly believed that an increase in environmental awareness is conducive to the protection of the global commons. Moreover, it has been proposed that governments should "give a good example" by unilaterally reducing emissions. In a simple analytical framework it is shown that these relations are less straightforward than intuitively expected. On the contrary: "good intentions" might lead to lower abatement targets within an international environmental agreement and to lower stability due to strategic behavior of governments.
Details
| Item Type | Articles | ||||
| Creators | Endres, A.and Finus, M. | ||||
| Related URLs |
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| Departments | Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
| Refereed | Yes | ||||
| Status | Published | ||||
| ID Code | 28407 |
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