Renegotiation-proof equilibria in a bargaining game over global emission reductions: does the instrumental framework matter?
Reference:
Endres, A. and Finus, M., 1998. Renegotiation-proof equilibria in a bargaining game over global emission reductions: does the instrumental framework matter? In: Hanley, N. and Folmer, H., eds. Game Theory and the Environment. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 135-164.
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Details
| Item Type | Book Sections |
| Creators | Endres, A.and Finus, M. |
| Editors | Hanley, N.and Folmer, H. |
| Departments | Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics |
| Status | Published |
| ID Code | 28410 |
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