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Renegotiation-proof equilibria in a bargaining game over global emission reductions: does the instrumental framework matter?


Reference:

Endres, A. and Finus, M., 1998. Renegotiation-proof equilibria in a bargaining game over global emission reductions: does the instrumental framework matter? In: Hanley, N. and Folmer, H., eds. Game Theory and the Environment. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 135-164.

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http://www.e-elgar.co.uk/

Details

Item Type Book Sections
CreatorsEndres, A.and Finus, M.
EditorsHanley, N.and Folmer, H.
DepartmentsFaculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics
StatusPublished
ID Code28410

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