Stability and success of regional fisheries management organizations
Pintassilgo, P., Finus, M., Lindroos, M. and Munro, G., 2010. Stability and success of regional fisheries management organizations. Environmental and Resource Economics, 46 (3), pp. 377-402.
Related documents:This repository does not currently have the full-text of this item.
You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided below. (Contact Author)
According to international law, straddling fish stocks should be managed cooperatively through regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs). This paper analyzes the stability and success of these organizations through a game in partition function form based on the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. Results show that the larger the number of fishing states that compete for the fish stock the higher are the relative gains from full cooperation, but the lower is the likelihood of large RFMOs being stable. It is also shown that new entrants increase the incentives of RFMO members to leave and decrease the incentives of non-members to join it. Moreover, the success of coalition formation is positively correlated with the degree of cost asymmetry among fishing states and negatively with the overall level of efficiency.
|Creators||Pintassilgo, P., Finus, M., Lindroos, M. and Munro, G.|
|Uncontrolled Keywords||environment and sustainability|
|Departments||Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics|
|Research Centres||Institute for Policy Research|
Actions (login required)