Stability of climate coalitions in a cartel formation game
Finus, M., van Ierland, E. and Dellink, R., 2006. Stability of climate coalitions in a cartel formation game. Economics of Governance, 7 (3), pp. 271-291.
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This paper analyses the formation and stability of coalitions to form international environmental agreements. We present and apply the Stability of coalitions model to assess the internal and external stability of all possible coalition structures in a cartel formation game; first under the assumption that no transfers take place and second for a transfer scheme. One important novelty of this paper is the analysis of the incentive structure of twelve regions for all possible combinations of (cartel) coalitions in an empirical setting with asymmetric regions. We show that stable coalitions can emerge only if benefits from global abatement are sufficiently high or if an appropriate transfer scheme is introduced.
|Creators||Finus, M., van Ierland, E. and Dellink, R.|
|Departments||Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics|
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