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Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?


Reference:

Finus, M., Rundshagen, B. and Eyckmans, J., 2014. Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served? Annals of Operations Research, 220 (1), pp. 5-23.

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    Official URL:

    http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-010-0815-x

    Abstract

    We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements, considering a sequential coalition formation process of heterogeneous and farsighted players. Players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by alternative proposals. We discuss the conceptual difficulties of implementing and solving such a game and the strategic options arising in a sequential process. This is illustrated with simple examples and with numerical simulations using the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM).

    Details

    Item Type Articles
    CreatorsFinus, M., Rundshagen, B. and Eyckmans, J.
    DOI10.1007/s10479-010-0815-x
    DepartmentsFaculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics
    RefereedYes
    StatusPublished
    ID Code28547

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