Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?
Finus, M., Rundshagen, B. and Eyckmans, J., 2014. Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served? Annals of Operations Research, 220 (1), pp. 5-23.
Related documents:This repository does not currently have the full-text of this item.
You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided below. (Contact Author)
We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements, considering a sequential coalition formation process of heterogeneous and farsighted players. Players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by alternative proposals. We discuss the conceptual difficulties of implementing and solving such a game and the strategic options arising in a sequential process. This is illustrated with simple examples and with numerical simulations using the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM).
|Creators||Finus, M., Rundshagen, B. and Eyckmans, J.|
|Departments||Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics|
Actions (login required)