International environmental agreements under uncertainty:Does the 'veil of uncertainty' help?


Finus, M. and Pintassilgo, P., 2012. International environmental agreements under uncertainty:Does the 'veil of uncertainty' help? Oxford Economic Papers, 64 (4), pp. 736-764.

Related documents:

PDF (Paper Finus and Pintassilgo, 2nd Revision, Final) - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
Download (240kB) | Preview

    Official URL:

    Related URLs:


    Na and Shin showed that the ‘veil of uncertainty’ can be conducive to the success of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Later papers confirmed this conclusion about the negative impact of learning. In the light of intensified research efforts worldwide to reduce uncertainty about the environmental impact of emissions and the cost of reducing them, this conclusion is intriguing. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we analyse whether the result carries over to a more general setting without restriction on the number of players and which considers not only ‘no’ and ‘full learning’ but also ‘partial learning’. Second, we test whether the conclusion also holds if there is uncertainty about abatement costs instead of uncertainty about the benefits from global abatement. Third, we propose a transfer scheme that mitigates the possible negative effect of learning and which may even transform it into a positive effect.


    Item Type Articles
    CreatorsFinus, M.and Pintassilgo, P.
    Related URLs
    URLURL Type
    DepartmentsFaculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics
    ID Code28549


    Actions (login required)

    View Item

    Document Downloads

    More statistics for this item...