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International environmental agreements under uncertainty : Does the 'veil of uncertainty' help?


Reference:

Finus, M. and Pintassilgo, P., 2012. International environmental agreements under uncertainty : Does the 'veil of uncertainty' help? Oxford Economic Papers, 64 (4), pp. 736-764.

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    Official URL:

    http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpr054

    Abstract

    Na and Shin showed that the ‘veil of uncertainty’ can be conducive to the success of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Later papers confirmed this conclusion about the negative impact of learning. In the light of intensified research efforts worldwide to reduce uncertainty about the environmental impact of emissions and the cost of reducing them, this conclusion is intriguing. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we analyse whether the result carries over to a more general setting without restriction on the number of players and which considers not only ‘no’ and ‘full learning’ but also ‘partial learning’. Second, we test whether the conclusion also holds if there is uncertainty about abatement costs instead of uncertainty about the benefits from global abatement. Third, we propose a transfer scheme that mitigates the possible negative effect of learning and which may even transform it into a positive effect.

    Details

    Item Type Articles
    CreatorsFinus, M.and Pintassilgo, P.
    DOI10.1093/oep/gpr054
    DepartmentsFaculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics
    RefereedYes
    StatusPublished
    ID Code28549

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