The effect of option granting on executive stock purchases
Reference:
Grout, P. A. and Zalewska, A., 2012. The effect of option granting on executive stock purchases. Economics Letters, 114 (1), pp. 12-15.
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Official URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.08.017
Abstract
We provide a simple asymmetric information model showing that, in contrast to portfolio diversification arguments, there is a natural complementarity between executive options and stock ownership. Moreover, managers can be made worse off by being granted more executive options.
Details
| Item Type | Articles |
| Creators | Grout, P. A.and Zalewska, A. |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.08.017 |
| Departments | School of Management |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published |
| ID Code | 29124 |
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