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Corporate visibility and executive pay


Reference:

Rayton, B. A., Brammer, S. and Cheng, S., 2012. Corporate visibility and executive pay. Economics Letters, 117 (1), pp. 337-339.

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    Official URL:

    http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.044

    Abstract

    This paper seeks evidence of implicit regulation of executive pay. The implicit regulation hypothesis suggests highly visible companies will constrain their behavior to avoid potential reprisals from constituents, politicians and potential regulators. We extend this literature using a measure of corporate visibility based on the number of news stories about each firm in a balanced panel of 242 public companies.

    Details

    Item Type Articles
    CreatorsRayton, B. A., Brammer, S. and Cheng, S.
    DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.044
    DepartmentsSchool of Management
    RefereedYes
    StatusPublished
    ID Code31216

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