Corporate visibility and executive pay
Rayton, B. A., Brammer, S. and Cheng, S., 2012. Corporate visibility and executive pay. Economics Letters, 117 (1), pp. 337-339.
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This paper seeks evidence of implicit regulation of executive pay. The implicit regulation hypothesis suggests highly visible companies will constrain their behavior to avoid potential reprisals from constituents, politicians and potential regulators. We extend this literature using a measure of corporate visibility based on the number of news stories about each firm in a balanced panel of 242 public companies.
|Creators||Rayton, B. A., Brammer, S. and Cheng, S.|
|Departments||School of Management|
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