Research

Corporate visibility and executive pay


Reference:

Rayton, B. A., Brammer, S. and Cheng, S., 2012. Corporate visibility and executive pay. Economics Letters, 117 (1), pp. 337-339.

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Official URL:

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.044

Abstract

This paper seeks evidence of implicit regulation of executive pay. The implicit regulation hypothesis suggests highly visible companies will constrain their behavior to avoid potential reprisals from constituents, politicians and potential regulators. We extend this literature using a measure of corporate visibility based on the number of news stories about each firm in a balanced panel of 242 public companies.

Details

Item Type Articles
CreatorsRayton, B. A., Brammer, S. and Cheng, S.
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.044
DepartmentsSchool of Management
RefereedYes
StatusPublished
ID Code31216

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