Does board independence matter for corporate insurance hedging?
Zou, H., Adams, M. and Xiao, J. Z., 2012. Does board independence matter for corporate insurance hedging? The Journal Of Financial Research, 35 (3), pp. 451-469.
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We test the effect of board independence on corporate purchases of property insurance. We find that board independence increases the incidence of property insurance use but does not have a significant effect on the extent of property insurance use given that a firm decides to insure its assets. These findings are consistent with the argument that: (1) more independent boards view it necessary to have property insurance to manage asset-loss risks and (2) excessive insurance or insurance purchases induced by managerial risk aversion and/or self-interest does not benefit shareholders and so may not be supported by independent boards
|Creators||Zou, H., Adams, M. and Xiao, J. Z.|
|Departments||School of Management|
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