Strategically Equivalent Contests


Chowdhury, S. M. and Sheremeta, R. M., 2014. Strategically Equivalent Contests. Theory and Decision, 78 (4), pp. 587-601.

Related documents:

This repository does not currently have the full-text of this item.
You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided below. (Contact Author)


Using a two-player Tullock-type contest, we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research.


Item Type Articles
CreatorsChowdhury, S. M.and Sheremeta, R. M.
DepartmentsFaculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics
ID Code57139


Actions (login required)

View Item