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Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry


Reference:

Choi, J. P., Chowdhury, S. M. and Kim, J., 2016. Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 118 (4), pp. 816-840.

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Official URL:

https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12152

Abstract

We investigate simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflict in the shadow of within-group power asymmetry and complementarity in members' group-conflict efforts. A more symmetric group faces a higher degree of internal conflict, and might expend more effort in external conflict when the group-conflict effort technology is highly complementary. Depending on the degree of complementarity, the stronger player's relative contribution to external conflict might be higher in a more asymmetric group and, as a result, it is possible for the weaker player to earn a higher payoff. In the absence of any complementarity, the rent-dissipation is non-monotonic with the within-group power asymmetry.

Details

Item Type Articles
CreatorsChoi, J. P., Chowdhury, S. M. and Kim, J.
DOI10.1111/sjoe.12152
DepartmentsFaculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics
RefereedYes
StatusPublished
ID Code57143

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