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Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction


Reference:

Chowdhury, S. M. and Topolyan, I., 2016. Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction. Social Choice and Welfare, 47 (4), pp. 959-971.

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Official URL:

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-1000-1

Abstract

We analyze a group political lobbying all-pay auction with a group specific public good prize, in which one group follows a weakest-link and the other group follows a best-shot impact function. We completely characterize all semi-symmetric equilibria. There are two types of equilibria: (1) each player in the best-shot group puts mass at the upper bound of the support, whereas each player in the other group puts mass at the lower bound of the support; (2) players in the best-shot group put masses at both the lower and the upper bounds, while the other group randomizes without a mass point. An earlier and longer version of this study was circulated under the title “The Group All-pay Auction with Heterogeneous Impact Functions.” We appreciate the comments of an Associate Editor and two anonymous referees, Kyung Hwan Baik, Walter Enders, Matt Van Essen, Paan Jindapon, David Malueg, Paul Pecorino, Seth Streitmatter, Ted Turocy, the participants at the 2015 conference of ‘Contest: Theory and Evidence’ at the University of East Anglia, and the seminar participants at the University of Alabama and Korea University. Iryna Topolyan gratefully acknowledges the support from the Charles Phelps Taft Research Center. Any remaining errors are our own.

Details

Item Type Articles
CreatorsChowdhury, S. M.and Topolyan, I.
DOI10.1007/s00355-016-1000-1
DepartmentsFaculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics
RefereedYes
StatusPublished
ID Code57145

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