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“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the Optimal Design of Multi-winner Contests


Reference:

Chowdhury, S. M. and Kim, S.-H., 2017. “Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the Optimal Design of Multi-winner Contests. Games and Economic Behavior, 104, pp. 486-493.

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Official URL:

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012

Abstract

We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests.

Details

Item Type Articles
CreatorsChowdhury, S. M.and Kim, S.-H.
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012
DepartmentsFaculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics
RefereedYes
StatusPublished
ID Code57150

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