Colluding Victims: A Public Choice Analysis of International Alliances


Jones, P., 2007. Colluding Victims: A Public Choice Analysis of International Alliances. Public Choice, 132 (3-4), pp. 319-32.

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Analysis of international alliances is often premised on predicted responses by nation states when nation states are assumed to behave as utility-maximising actors. 'Large' allies are exploited by 'small' allies when output is a public good. Empirical analysis of defence expenditures in NATO yields results consistent with the proposition that 'exploitation' increases as alliance output approximates a pure public good. But why would large countries acquiesce? A public choice analysis offers a different perspective. If producers of armaments are rent seeking, are large allies able to capture rent by incurring a disproportionate share of defence expenditure?


Item Type Articles
CreatorsJones, P.
Uncontrolled Keywordsrent-seeking,and voting behavior (d720),elections,models of political processes,national security and war (h560),legislatures,international organizations (f530),international agreements and observance
DepartmentsFaculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Social & Policy Sciences
Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics
ID Code9783


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