Colluding Victims: A Public Choice Analysis of International Alliances
Reference:
Jones, P., 2007. Colluding Victims: A Public Choice Analysis of International Alliances. Public Choice, 132 (3-4), pp. 319-32.
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Abstract
Analysis of international alliances is often premised on predicted responses by nation states when nation states are assumed to behave as utility-maximising actors. 'Large' allies are exploited by 'small' allies when output is a public good. Empirical analysis of defence expenditures in NATO yields results consistent with the proposition that 'exploitation' increases as alliance output approximates a pure public good. But why would large countries acquiesce? A public choice analysis offers a different perspective. If producers of armaments are rent seeking, are large allies able to capture rent by incurring a disproportionate share of defence expenditure?
Details
| Item Type | Articles |
| Creators | Jones, P. |
| Uncontrolled Keywords | rent-seeking, and voting behavior (d720), elections, models of political processes, national security and war (h560), legislatures, international organizations (f530), international agreements and observance |
| Departments | Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Social & Policy Sciences Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published |
| ID Code | 9783 |
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