Colluding Victims: A Public Choice Analysis of International Alliances
Jones, P., 2007. Colluding Victims: A Public Choice Analysis of International Alliances. Public Choice, 132 (3-4), pp. 319-32.
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Analysis of international alliances is often premised on predicted responses by nation states when nation states are assumed to behave as utility-maximising actors. 'Large' allies are exploited by 'small' allies when output is a public good. Empirical analysis of defence expenditures in NATO yields results consistent with the proposition that 'exploitation' increases as alliance output approximates a pure public good. But why would large countries acquiesce? A public choice analysis offers a different perspective. If producers of armaments are rent seeking, are large allies able to capture rent by incurring a disproportionate share of defence expenditure?
|Uncontrolled Keywords||rent-seeking, and voting behavior (d720), elections, models of political processes, national security and war (h560), legislatures, international organizations (f530), international agreements and observance|
|Departments||Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Social & Policy Sciences|
Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics
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