Research

Items by Chowdhury, Subhasish

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Number of items: 22.

Articles

Chowdhury, S. M. and Kim, S.-H., 2017. “Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the Optimal Design of Multi-winner Contests. Games and Economic Behavior, 104, pp. 486-493.

Chowdhury, S. M., Jeon, J. Y. and Saha, B., 2017. Gender Differences in the Giving and Taking Variants of the Dictator Game. Southern Economic Journal

Balart, P., Chowdhury, S. M. and Troumpounis, O., 2017. Linking Individual and Collective Contests through Noise Level and Sharing Rules. Economics Letters, 155, pp. 126-130.

Chowdhury, S. M. and Moffatt, P. G., 2017. Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments: A Comment on the Endowment Effect. Journal of Economic Surveys, 31 (2), pp. 572-576.

Chowdhury, S. M. and Martin, S., 2017. Exclusivity and exclusion on platform Markets. Journal of Economics, 120 (2), pp. 95-118.

Brown, A. and Chowdhury, S., 2017. The Hidden Perils of Affirmative Action:Sabotage in Handicap Contests. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 133, pp. 273-284.

Chowdhury, S. M. and Topolyan, I., 2016. Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction. Social Choice and Welfare, 47 (4), pp. 959-971.

Choi, J. P., Chowdhury, S. M. and Kim, J., 2016. Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 118 (4), pp. 816-840.

Chowdhury, S. M., Jeon, J. Y. and Ramalingam, A., 2016. Identity and Group Conflict. European Economic Review, 90, pp. 107-121.

Chowdhury, S. M., Lee, D. and Topolyan, I., 2016. The Max-Min Group Contest: Weakest-link (Group) All-pay Auction. Southern Economic Journal, 83 (1), pp. 105-125.

Chowdhury, S. M. and Topolyan, I., 2016. The Attack-and-Defense Group Contests: Best-shot versus Weakest-link. Economic Inquiry, 54 (1), pp. 548-557.

Chowdhury, S. M. and Gurtler, O., 2015. Sabotage in contests: a survey. Public Choice, 164 (1-2), pp. 135-155.

Chowdhury, S. M. and Sheremeta, R. M., 2014. Strategically Equivalent Contests. Theory and Decision, 78 (4), pp. 587-601.

Chowdhury, S. M. and Kim, S.-H., 2014. A Note on Multi-winner Contest Mechanisms. Economics Letters, 125 (3), pp. 357-359.

Chowdhury, S. M., Sheremeta, R. M. and Turocy, T. L., 2014. Overbidding and Overspreading in Rent-seeking Experiments: Cost Structure and Prize Allocation Rules. Games and Economic Behavior, 87, pp. 224-238.

Chowdhury, S., Lee, D. and Sheremeta, R., 2013. Top Guns May Not Fire: Best-Shot Group Contests with Group-Specific Public Good Prizes. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 92, pp. 94-103.

Chowdhury, S., Sheremeta, R. and Kovenock, D., 2013. An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games. Economic Theory, 52 (3), pp. 833-861.

Chowdhury, S. and Sheremeta, R., 2011. Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests. Economics Letters, 112 (2), pp. 216-219.

Chowdhury, S. and Sheremeta, R., 2011. A Generalized Tullock Contest. Public Choice, 147 (3), pp. 413-420.

Chowdhury, S. and Datta, D., 2009. Indian Telecom: Regulation, Spectrum Allocation and Dispute Management. IIMB Management Review, 21 (4), pp. 287-296.

This list was generated on Sun Nov 19 14:18:48 2017 GMT.